[In the first edition]
Everything that happens (begins to be) presupposes something which it follows in accordance with a rule.
[In the second edition:]
Proof
<(That all appearances of the temporal sequence are her words, through collectively only alterations, i.e., a successive being and not-being of the determinations of the substance that persists there, consequently that the being of the substance itself, which succeeds its not-being, or its not-being, which succeeds its being, in other words, that the arising or perishing of the substance does not occur, the previous principle has shown. This could also have been expressed thus: All change (succession) of appearances is only alteration; for the arising or perishing of substance are not alterations of it, since the concept of alteration presupposes one and the same subject as existing with two opposed determinations , ad thus as persisting. -After this preliminary reminder of the proof follows.)
I perceive that appearances succeed one another=, i.e., that a state of things exists at one time the opposite of which existed in the previous state. Thu I really connect two perceptions in time. Now connection is not the work of mere sense and intuition, but is here rather the product of a synthetic faculty of the imagination, but is here rather the product of a synthetic faculty of the imagination, which determines inner sense with regard to temporal relations. This, however, can combine the two states in question in two different ways, so that either one or the other precedes in time; for time cannot be perceived in itself, nor can what precedes and what follows in objects be as it were empirically determined in relation to it. I am therefore only conscious that my imagination places one state before and the other after, not that the one state precedes the other in the object; or, in other words, through the mere perception the objective relation of the appearances that are succeeding one another remains undetermined. Now in order for this to be cognized as determined, the relation between the two states must be thought in such a way that it is thereby necessarily determined which of them must be placed before and which after rather than vice versa. The concept,, that carries a necessity of synthetic unity with it can only be azure concept of understand in, which does not lie in the perception, and that is here the concept of the relation of cause and effect, the former of which determines the latter in time, as its consequence, and not as something that could merely precede in the imagination (or not even be perceived at all). Therefore it is only because we subject the sequence of the appearances and thus all alteration to the law of causality that experience itself, i.e., empirical cognition of them, is possible; consequently they themselves, as object of experience, are possible only in accordance with this law.>
The apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive. The representations of the parts succeed one another. Whether they also succeed in the object is a second point for reflection, which is not contained in the first. Now one can, to be sure, call everything, and even every representations, insofar as one is conscious of it, an object; only what this word is to mean in the case of appearances, not insofar as they are (as representations) objects, but rather only insofar as they designate an object, requires a deeper investigation. Insofar as they are, merely as representations, at the same time objects of consciousness, they do not differ from their apprehension, i.e, from their being taken up into the synthesis of the imagination, and one must therefore say that the manifold of appearances is always successively generated in the mind. If appearances were things in themselves, then no human being would be able to assess form the succession of representations how the manifold is combined in the object. For we have to do only with our representations; how things in themselves may be (without regard to representations through which they affect us) is entirely beyond our cognitive sphere. Now although the appearances are not things in themselves, and nevertheless are the only thing that can be given to us for cognition, I still have to show what sort of combination in time pertains to the manifold in the appearances itself even though the representational of it in apprehension is always successive. Thus, e.g, the apprehension of the manifold in the appearance of a house that stands before me is successive. Now the question is whether the manifold of this house itself is also successive, which certainly no one will concede. Now, however, as soon as I raise my concept of an object to transcendental significance, the house is not a thing in itself at all but only an appearance, i.e., a representation, the transcendental object of which is unknown; therefore what do I understand by the question, how the manifold may be combined in the appearance itself (which is yet nothing in itself)? Here that which lies in the successive apprehension is considered as representation, but the appearance that is given to me, in spite of the fact that it is nothing more than a sum of these representations, is considered as their object, with which my concept, which I draw from the representations of apprehension, is to agree. One quickly sees that, since the agreement of cognition with the object is truth, only the formal conditions of empirical truth can be inquired after here, and appearance, in contradistinction to the are presentations of apprehension, and makes one way of combining the manifold necessary. That in the appearance contains the condition of this necessary rule of apprehension is the object.
Now let us proceed to our problem. That something happens, i.e., that something or a state comes to be that previously was not, cannot be empirically perceived except where an appearance precedes that does not contain this state in itself; for a reality that would follow on an empty time, thus an arising not preceded by any state of things, can be apprehended just as little as empty time itself. Every apprehension of an occurrence is therefore a perception that follows another one. Since this is the case in all synthesis of apprehension, however, as I have shown above in the case of the appearance of a house, the apprehension of an occurrence is not yet thereby distinguished from any other. Yet I also note that, if in the case of an appearance that contains a happening I call the preceding state of perception A and the following one B, then B can only follow A in apprehension, but the perception A cannot follow but only precede B. E.g., I see a ship driven downstream. My perception of its position downstream follows the perception of its position upstream, and it is impossible that in the apprehension of this appearance of the ship should first be perceived downstream and afterwards upstream. The order in the sequence of the perceptions in apprehension is therefore here determined, and the apprehension is bound to it. In the previous example of a house my perceptions could have begun at its rooftop and ended at the ground, but could also have begun below and ended above; likewise I could have apprehended the manifold of empirical intuition from the right or from the left. In the series of these perceptions there was therefore no determinate order that made it necessary when I had to begin in the apprehension in order to combine the manifold empirically. But this rule is always to be found in the perception of hat which happens, and it makes the order of perceptions that follow one another (in the apprehension of this appearance) necessary.
In our case I must therefore derive the subjective sequence of apprehension from the objective sequence of appearances, for otherwise the former would be entirely undetermined and no appearance would be distinguished from any other. The former alone proves nothing about the connection of the manifold in the object, because it is entirely arbitrary. This connection must therefore consist in the order of the manifold of appearance in accordance with which the apprehension of one thing (that which happens) follows that of the other (which precedes) in accordance with a rule. Only thereby can I be justified in saying of the appearance itself, and not merely of my apprehension, that a sequences to be encountered in it, which is to say as much as that I cannot arrange the apprehension otherwise than in exactly this sequence.
In accordance with such a rule there must therefore lie in that which in general precedes an occurrence the condition for a rule, in accordance with which this occurrence always and necessarily follows; conversely, however, I cannot go back from the occurrence and determine (through apprehension) what precedes. For no appearance goes back from the following point of time to the preceding one, but it is related merely to some preceding point or other; on the contrary, the progress from a given time to the determinately following one is necessary. Hence, since there is still something that follows, I must necessarily relate it to something else in general that precedes, and on which it follows in accordance with a rule, i.e., necessarily, so that the occurrences the conditioned, yields, a secure indication of some condition, but it is the latter that determines the occurrence.
If one were to suppose that nothing preceded an occurrence that it must follow in accordance with a rule, then all sequence of perception would be determined solely in apprehension, i.e, merely subjectively, but it would not thereby be objectively determined which of the perceptions must really be the preceding one and which the succeeding one. In this way we would have only a play of representations that would not be related to any object at all, i.e., by means of our perception no appearance would be distinguished from any other as far as the temporal relation is concerned, since the succession in the apprehending is always the same, and there is therefore nothing in the appearance that determines it so that a certain sequence is thereby made necessary as objective. I would therefore not say that in appearance two states follow one another, but rather only that one apprehension follows the other, which is something merely subjective, and determines no object, and thus cannot count as the cognition of any object (not even in the appearance).
If, therefore, we experience that something happens, then we always presuppose that something else precedes it, which it follows in accordance with a rule. For without this I would not say of the object that it follows, since the mere sequence in my apprehension, if it is not, by means of a rule, determined in relation to something preceding, does not justify any sequence in the object. Therefore I always make my subjective synthesis (of apprehension) objective with respect to a rule in accordance with which the appearances in their sequence, i.e., as they occur, are determined through the preceding state, and only under this presupposition alone is the experience of something that happens even possible.
To be sure, it seems as if this contradicts everything that has always been said about the course of the use of our understanding, according to which it is only through the perception and comparison of sequences of many occurrences on preceding appearances teat we are led to discover a rule, in accordance with which certain occurrences always follow certain appearances, and are thereby first prompted to form the concept of cause. On such a footing this concept would be merely empirical, and the rule that it supplies, that everything that happens has a cause, would be just as contingent as the experience itself: its universality and necessity would then be merely feigned, and would have no true universal validity, since they would not be grounded a priori but only on induction. But the case is the same here as with other pure a priori representations (e.g. space and time) that we can extract as clear concepts from experience only because we have put them into experience, and experience Is hence first brought about through them. For rouse the logical clarity of this representations of a rule determining the series of occurrences, as that of a concept of cause, is only possible if we have made use of it in experience, but a consideration of it,. As the condition of the synthetic unity of the appearances in time, was nevertheless the ground of experience itself, and therefore preceded it a priori.
It is therefore important to show by an example that even in experience we never ascribe sequence of an occurrence, in which something happens that previously did not exist) to the object, and distinguish it from the subjective sequence of our apprehension, except when a rule is the ground that necessitates us to obeserve this order of the perceptions rather than another, indeed that it is realy this necessitation that first makes possible the representation of a successsion in the object.
We have representations in us, wof which we can also become conscious. But let this consciousness reacha s far and be as exact and precise as one wants, still there always remain only representations, i.e., inner determinations of our mind in this or that temporal relation. Now how do we come to posit an object for these representations, or ascribe to their subjective reality, as modifications, some sort of objective reality? Objective significance cannot consist in the relation to another representation (of that which one would call the object), for that woulod simply raise anew the question: How does this representation in turn go beyond itself and acquire objective significance in addition to the subjective significance that is proper to it as a determination of the state of mind? If we investigate what new characteristic is given to our representations by the relation to an object, and what is the dignity that they thereby receive, we find that it does nothing beond making the combination of represeentations necessary in a certain way, and subjecting them to a rule; and conversely that objective significance is conferred on our representations only insofar as a certain order in tehir temporal relation is necessary.
In the synthesis of the appearnce s the manifold representations always follow wone aanother. Now by this means no object at all is rpersented; since through this sequence, which is common to all apprehensions, nothing is distinguished form anythign else. But as soon as I perceive or anticipate that there is in this seuqence a relation to the precedingin state, from which the represetnation follows in accordance with a rule, I represent somehting as an occurrence, or as something that happens, ie.e., I cognize tan ojbect tha I must place in time in a determinate position, which, after the preceding state, cannot beotherwsise assigned to it. Thus if I perceive that something happens, then the first thing conatinaed in this representation is that something precedes, for it is just in relation to this that the apperance acquires its temproal relation, that, namely, of existing after a preceding time in which it did not. But it can only acuquire its determinate temproal position in this relation through somehting being presupposed in the preceding stateon which it always follows, i.e., follows in accordance with a rule: from which it results, first, that I cannot reverse ths eries and place that which happens prior to that which it follows; and, second, that if the state that precedes is posited, then this determinate occurrence inevitably and necessarily follows. Thereby does it come about htat there is an order among our representations, in which the present one (insofar as it ihas come to be) points to some preceding state as a correlate, tob be sure still undetermined, of this event that is given, which is, however, determinately related to the latter, as its consequence, and necessarily connected with it in the temporal series.
Now if it is a necessary law of our sensibility, thus a formal condition of all perceptions, that the preceding time necessarily determines the follwonign time (in that I cannot arrive at the following time exept by passing through the preceding one), then it is also ian indispensiable law of the empirical representation of the temporal series that the apperanaces of the psat time determine every existence in the following time, and that these, as occurrences, do not take place except insofar as the former determine their existence in time, I,.e., establish it in oaccordance with a rule. For only in the appearances can we empirically cognize this continuity in the connection of times.
Understanding belongs to all experience and its possibility, and the first thing that it does for this is not to make the representation of the objects distinct, but rather to make the representation of an object possible at all. Now this happens through its conferring temporal order on the apperaances and their existence by assigning to each of these, as a consequence, a place in tiem determined a priori in regard to the precedeing apperaacnes, without which it would not agree with time itself, which determines the position of all its parts a priori. Now this determination of position cannot be borrowed from the relation of the apperanaceds to absolute time (for that is not anaobject of perception), but, conversely, the appearances themselves must determine their position in time for each other, and make this determination in the temporal order necessary, i.e., that which follows or happens must succeeded that which was contained in the preveious state in accoradance with a general rule from which arises a series of apepraances, in which by meanas of the understanding the very same order and constant connection in the series of possible perceptions ins produced and made necessary as would be encountered a priori in the form of inner experience (time), in which all perceptions would have to have their place.
That something happens, therefore, is a perception that belongs to a possible experience, which becomes actual if I regard the position of the appearance as determined in time, thus if I regard it as an object that can always be found in the connection of perceptions in accordance with a rule. This rule for determining something with respect to its temporal sequence, however, is that in what precedes, the condition is to be encountered under which the occurrence always (i.e. necessarily) follows. Thus the principle of sufficient reason is the ground of possible experience, namely the objective cognition of appearances with regard to their relation in the successive series of time.
The ground of proof of this proposition, however, rests solely on the following moments. To all empirical cognition there belongs the synthesis of the manifold through the imagination, which is always successive; i.e., the representations always follow each other in it. But the order of the sequence (what must precede and what must follow) is not determined in the imagination at all, and the series of successive representations can be taken backwards just as well as forwards. But if this synthesis is a synthesis of apprehension (of the manifold of a given appearance), then the order in the object is determined, or, to speak more precisely, there is therein an order of the successive synthesis that determines an object, in accordance with which something would necessarily have to precede and, if this is posited, the other would necessarily have to follow. If, therefore, my perception is to contain the cognition of an occurrence, namely that something actually happens, then it must be an empirical judgment in which one thinks that the sequence is determined, i.e., that it presupposes another appearance in time which it follows necessarily or in accordance with a rule. Contrariwise, if I were to posit that which precedes and the occurrence did not follow it ncesssarily then I would have to hold it to be only a subjective play of my imaginings, and if I still represented something objective by it I would have to call it a mere dream. Thus the relation of apperances (as possible perceptions) in accordance with which the existence of that which succeeds (what happens) is determined in time necessarily and in accordance with a rule by something that precedes it, consequently the relation of cause to effect, is the condition of the objective validity of our empirical judgments with regard to the series of perceptions, thus of their empirical truth, and therefore of experience. Hence the principle of the causal relation in the sequence of appearancses is valid for all objects of experience (under the conditions of succession), since it is itself the gournd of the possibility of such an experience.
Here, however, there is a reservation that must be resolved. The principle of causal connection among apperances is, in our formula, limited to the succession of them, although in the use of the is principle it turns out that it is also applies to their accompaniment, and cause and effect can be simultaneous. E.g., there is a warmth in a room that is not to be encountered in the outside air. I look around for the cause, and find a heated stove. Now this, as the cause, is simultaneous with its effect, the warmth of the chamber; thus here there is no successsion in tiem between cause and effect, rather they are simultaneous, yet the law still holds. The majority of efficient causes in nature are simultaneous with their effects, and the temporal sequence of the latter is occasioned only by the fact that the cause cannot achieve its entire effect in one instant. But in the instant in which the effect first arises, it is always simultaneous with the causality of its cause, since if the cause had ceased to be an instant before then the effect would never have arisen. Here one must note that it is the order of tiem and not its lapse that is taken account of; the relation remains even if no time has elapsed. The time between the causality to f the cause and its immediate effect can be vanishing (they can therefore be simultaneous), but the temporal relation of the one to the other still remains determinable. If I consider a ball that lies on a stuffed pillow and makes a dent in it as a cause, it is simulatneous with its effect. Yet I still distinguish the two by means of the temporal relation of the dynamical connection. For if I lay the ball ofn the pillow the dent follows its previously smooth shape; but if (for whatever reason) the pillow has a dent, a leaden ball does not follow it.
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