Thursday, December 10, 2009

Pragmatism entails Traditionalism?

Okay, so we've pointed out in the last 3 or 4 posts that the astrological sign Capricorn is known both for pragmatism and traditionalism, both sort of entailed with a motto, "I use."

We pointed out that Simone de Beauvoir (French pronunciation: [simɔn də boˈvwaʀ]) (January 9, 1908 – April 14, 1986) is not a Pragmatist but rather an existentialist; and Charles Margrave Taylor, CC, GOQ, FRSC (born November 5, 1931) a certifiable traditionalist is really a Scorpio. (Hold the phone: doesn't the Traditionalism always smack of Foundationalism, whereupon Foundationalism is a Scorpio trait?)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simone_Beauvoir
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Taylor_%28philosopher%29

On the other hand, we have shown the two greatest American Pragmatist Philosophers, Benjamin Franklin (January 17, 1706 [O.S. January 6, 1705[1]] – April 17, 1790) and William James (January 11, 1842 – August 26, 1910), are also Capricorns.

I said to Rick, "Shouldn't Descartes be the poster child for Dualism (Gemini) or Foundationalism (Scorpio)?"

Rick said, "Would Descartes think of himself as a Dualist?"


But again the spirit of all of this is to tell the story of the philosophers and to explore where they fit and do not fit into these stories. In this way it's just as important to see how these do not fit into the story.

I think Pragmatism entails a sort of Traditionalism because the motto of "Whatever works" is necessarily past-dependent. Contrast this with a speculative philosophy, based on what has not happened or the boundaries of experience. Pragmatism necessarily functions based on the past.


Pragmatism
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pragmatism


But John Dewey (October 20, 1859 – June 1, 1952) is a libra-scorpio; and Charles Sanders Peirce (pronounced /ˈpɜrs/ purse[1]) (September 10, 1839 – April 19, 1914) is a virgo.



Here's what Wikipedia says about Pragmatism:


Pragmatism is a philosophical movement that includes those who claim that an ideology or proposition is true if it works satisfactorily, that the meaning of a proposition is to be found in the practical consequences of accepting it, and that unpractical ideas are to be rejected. Pragmatism began in the late nineteenth century with Charles Sanders Peirce and his pragmatic maxim. Through the early twentieth-century it was developed further in the works of William James, John Dewey and—in a more unorthodox manner—by George Santayana. Other important aspects of pragmatism include anti-Cartesianism, radical empiricism, instrumentalism, anti-realism, verificationism, conceptual relativity, a denial of the fact-value distinction, a high regard for science, and fallibilism.

Pragmatism enjoyed renewed attention from the 1960s on when a new analytic school of philosophy (W. V. O. Quine and Wilfrid Sellars) put forth a revised pragmatism criticizing the logical positivism dominant in the United States and Britain since the 1930s. Richard Rorty further developed and widely publicized the concept of naturalized epistemology; his later work grew closer to continental philosophy and is considered relativistic by its critics.

Contemporary pragmatism is divided into a strict analytic tradition, a more relativistic strand (in the wake of Rorty), and "neo-classical" pragmatism (such as Susan Haack) that adheres to the work of Peirce, James, and Dewey.




Here's the old Pragmatic Maxim by Peirce (also from Wikipedia):

The pragmatic maxim, also known as the maxim of pragmatism or the maxim of pragmaticism, is a maxim of logic formulated by Charles Sanders Peirce. Serving as a normative recommendation or a regulative principle in the normative science of logic, its function is to guide the conduct of thought toward the achievement of its purpose, advising on an optimal way of "attaining clearness of apprehension". Here is its original 1878 statement in English[1] when it was not yet named:

It appears, then, that the rule for attaining the third grade of clearness of apprehension is as follows: Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.
(Peirce on p. 293 of "How to Make Our Ideas Clear", Popular Science Monthly, v. 12, pp. 286–302. Reprinted widely, including Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (CP) v. 5, paragraphs 388–410.)



"Whatever works."
"If it's true, it's useful; if it's useful it's true."

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