Be Free Now

Going back to the Nietzche don't believe in free will thing; I think it's because the only way that a person could be free is in the moment. In the Walter Kauffman translated Nineteenth Century Philosophy anthology; there's an entry where Nietzche says Free Will does not exist, and in fact it was made up by the religions in order to make the religions powerful. He said it also exists in order to ascribe punishment.

Nietzche might be mad that I'm extrapolating so much from his stuff; but I want to point out that the only time a free choice could be taken is in the present moment. I want you to think about that for a second or at least have it in the noggin while we go over:

Two Kantian Theories of Freedom

The first theory is Autonomy or Moral Autonomy. This exists in his moral writings. The Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals is often considered the greatest Kantian work on Ethics. I like the Critique of Practical Reason because it kind of rubs my brain the right way.

Anyway, the way Autonomy works is by contrast with externality. What we mean by externality is anything that is not the case.

By isolating the case as the only thing that could be the case, Kant does an elegant hopscotch. He basically asks us to flag our premises, at the top of our baby logic derivation.

The problem of Determinism says that if someone is predestined by natural forces (chemicals in the brain, psychology of the parents raising you, I don't know; maybe the pleasure that you get from doing something) then you do not have the ability to control what happens. If you do not control what happens, then there is no way you can be responsible for what happens.

The Metaphysical theory of Autonomy (freedom) reads like this: in the Antinomies of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant points out that freedom could be possible if there were a first cause in the noumenal realm, which would then in a non-temporal (not in time), maybe it could jump in the phenomenal realm at any given second and change the series (I'm thinking here thought stream, but it's probably like mental capacities in the whatever-Kant-was-thinking sense).

If the first theory of freedom is satisfying (and I think it is) and the second is unsatisfying, don't think Kant didn't catch it. There are Kantian writings saying that he wishes he put a better stab at it. The first theory of autonomy is pretty good, I think. You might turn to the Ethics of Identity by Kwame Anthony Appiah for a better definition.

I agree with Nietzche though, and even though it is mutually exclusive with Kant's theories, I sympathize with Kant. Kant says we need to pose freedom in order to pursue morality. Nietzche says we need to be responsible in the moment. Ascribing blame and punishment is not being responsible in the way that Nietzche knows we should be.