A Mill Counterexample
Professor Hinton:
Please don't critique quote checks. I promise I'll cite the document properly for thursday.
In this brief paper I shall first explain Mill's argument for the second chapter of his On Liberty Essay, "Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion." I shall then present my criticism that Mill falls prey to an "allness" fallacy; that he believes everyone would benefit from freedom of speech because of the totality of his examples. My comment stems both from being Jewish, the allness fallacy of his Christian examples already nullfied; and from my discussion in class about religion and spirituality. We will then consider a supposed response from John Stuart Mill.
Mill has two hypotheses about freedom of speech that he seeks to defend. Mill says, "It is necessary to consider separately these two hypotheses, each of which has a distinct branch of the argument corresponding to it. We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavouring to stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still" (Mill). In other words, the first is that people are prone to be wrong; and the second is the question of "So what if the opinion is false?" and then what? Mill argues that in order to support the truth, people have to subject it to the objections and fill any metaporical holes that can be poked into the supposed truth.
In the first hypothesis, Mill says that people in situations where they are looking for the best need the freedom of expression for the assurance that they are acting to the best of their abilities. He says, "Men and governments must act to the best of their ability. There is no such thing as absolute certainty, but there is assurance sufficient for the purposes of human life." (Mill 18). This is because no person is infallible, or capable of mistakes. "All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility. Its condemnation may be allowed to rest on this common argument, not the worse for being common." So the purpose of freedom of speech for Mill is very much a pragmatic one, that freedom of speech will lead to better lives and better situations. In these quotes, he reminds readers that the point of listening to freedom of speech can be reassuring, if the individuals in question are wrong about what they claim; and secondly important as a building process, that revealing the truth pragmatically leads societies to the truth.
In the second hypothesis, the esteemed author says that if the contentious opinion in question is false, there is still something to be gained if it is argued and lost if it is squelched. The text says, "Let us now pass to the second division of the argument, and dismissing the Supposition that any of the received opinions may be false, let us assume them to be true, and examine into the worth of the manner in which they are likely to be held, when their truth is not freely and openly canvassed" (Mill). In other words, if the truth is held fast as true, there should be no trouble in subjecting to criticism or opposing opinions. Mill continues, "However unwillingly a person who has a strong opinion may admit the possibility that his opinion may be false, he ought to be moved by the consideration that however true it may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth" (Mill). Here he states that a truth that cannot be discussed is dogma and not a living truth. The accusation of "dogma" is that of tradition for tradition's sake, which is an accusation of circularity of logic. That is, Mill attacks a supposed opponent's bad logic.
After the projection of these hypotheses, Mill goes on to expound what he sees are the general anecdotal evidences for these positions. Frequently, Mill harkens to Christian doctrine. For the first hypothesis, Mill says, "Those in whose eyes this reticence on the part of heretics is no evil, should consider in the first place, that in consequence of it there is never any fair and thorough discussion of heretical opinions;" that they are just burned, or killed. Mill continues, "But it is not the minds of heretics that are deteriorated most," rather, "The greatest harm done is to those who are not heretics, and whose whole mental development is cramped, and their reason cowed, by the fear of heresy" (Mill). In other words, the squelched opinion that is right leaves society at large in the dark.
An emblematic quote of Mill's support of the second opinion against objections is "But what! (it may be asked) Is the absence of unanimity an indispensable condition of true knowledge? Is it necessary that some part of mankind should persist in error, to enable any to realize the truth? Does a belief cease to be real and vital as soon as it is generally received—and is a proposition never thoroughly understood and felt unless some doubt of it remains? As soon as mankind have unanimously accepted a truth, does the truth perish within them?" Mill believes that if a truth is argued in the first place, there is probably something more ideal to work toward and progress toward. Mill says, "The highest aim and best result of improved intelligence, it has hitherto been thought, is to unite mankind more and more in the acknowledgment of all important truths: and does the intelligence only last as long as it has not achieved its object? Do the fruits of conquest perish by the very completeness of the victory? (Mill). Thusly, Mill thinks that only success can come from questioning the foundations of social norms and laws.
Is there a problem here with how the is done? Thankfully, Mill does not argue any famous David Hume causality arguments. It's taken for granted that cause and effect necessarily exist. But I will take that criticism on. Mill's writing uses Readers are then encouraged to consider that truth always helps society. The Berlin reading says that Mill's argument falls prey to his genius argument. In a dictatorial society that is highly regimented and squelches opinions still produces genius, where does Mill's argument lie? To say that free speech causes genius is flawed as it is not empirical and it is not quite anecdotal. It is a made up premise. You could never watch freedom causing genius any more than you could watch anything cause genius.
Do we know that truth causes the betterment of society? Mill assumes that readers already know this. Mill says, "there are, it is alleged, certain beliefs so useful, not to say indispensable, to well-being that it is as much the duty of governments to uphold those beliefs as to protect any other of the interests of society" (Mill 21). But it's not hard to think of a truth that could harm society, if society knew about it.
A basic hypothetical situation would go like this: Kurt Vonnegut created a nuclear-warhead parallel his book Cat's Cradle. The idea is that a variation on water's atomic structure could create a new type of ice. This type of ice, Ice-9 would be able to freeze water above 0 degrees Celsius, instead freezing everything at about room temperature. In this way everyone would freeze instantly. In the book, having just a vial-full Ice-9 shaped molecules touch the outside world would cause such a cataclysm.
To say that people would be reassured that no one had this knowledge, I think, is reasonable.
Next, Mill takes for granted that everyone espouses Christian doctrines and no one actually does them. This is absolutely not safe to say. In England in the 1850's there were few enough Jews, and probably few enough in Academia, that Mill did not have to speak to them at all. In other words, not everyone is Christian enough to be a Christian hypocrite.
I made this very mistake in class when I said that no one actually lives a trulty spiritual life whereupon they pick and choose doctrines from various traditions. Several students reacted vehemently and angrily. Surely they were living pious lives, they thought, and said out loud.
Mill would certainly say to this that from the law of averages, freedom causes genius, as a necessary conclusion to his thought experiment. That is, if freedom is squelched every time that genius occurs.
Tuesday, September 8, 2009
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