And Another Thing 1: Sequel to What's Wrong with a Little Destruction?

Where, praytell, do we draw the line between superstition and science; pseudoscience meets science?

I've got some answers from our basic 100 level science classes (psychology and biology) that I'll reprint on this blog soon. I've also got some basic level Epistemology that I can post on here (hint: it's not Justified True Belief gang!)

Basically we figured out that science and knowledge is/are repeatable, fallible and capable of being proven wrong, and objective. People use Occam's Razor, which states that the simplest explanation is usually the correct one. (How does this work for, say, complex explanations that are correct?)

From what I understood about Berkeley, his criticism of science stands pretty firmly. For example, when I ask what gravity is, and you say it's stuff falling to the ground, that's a substitution and not an elaboration of the definition. If we did an identity substitution, that helps out with logic-math, but not necessarily with answers. The sun is not yellow because it is yellow. Gravity is not just stuff falling to the ground.

Berkeley, Spinoza, and Descartes are too close to the edge of superstition. Berkeley believed that things only exist in the mind of God (or us); Descartes rested his entire foundation of knowledge on his faulty proofs of God, and Spinoza created an entire system that is so certain that it pushes the limits of science into pseudoscience: there is no way we could ever know the total objectivity and determinism of his system outside of the mathematics he cherished.

More on this later.